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Abstraet--A two-on-one combat game is a dynamic encounter in which there are three participants. Each 
participant controls its motion in some state space and has its own target set. Two of the participants 
team up against the third and attempt to capture it. The latter maneuvers to avoid capture and also to 
capture both team members. This paper employs differential game theory and the theory of combat games, 
to set up a mathematical decision framework and develop solution methods based on a penalty function 
approach for two-on-one combat games. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A two-on-one combat game is a dynamic encounter in which there are three participants. Each 
participant, or player, controls its own motion in some state space, and also has a target set. Any 
player that enters into the target set of another is said to have been captured at the instant of entry; 
it is considered isabled for the rest of the encounter. The players are divided into two opposing 
teams, one consisting of a single player u and the other of the two players v~ and vs. The combat 
encounter terminates once all the players in one team are captured. The team with at least one 
surviving player is the winner of the game. The aim of each team is to win the game at the least 
cost to itself; if it cannot avoid losing, then its aim is to inflict the maximum damage upon its 
adversary. 
Such encounters model common tactical situations in combat between aircraft, tanks or 
helicopters and so on. Besides the derivation of tactics for given situations, the study of these 
encounters has important implications for military planning as it should generate answers to the 
perennial question of how much quality is needed to offset quantity. This paper aims to set up a 
decision framework for such encounters based upon differential game theory. 
In many ways this work is a natural outgrowth of earlier work on combat games [1-4]. As 
analyzed in these references, a combat game is an encounter between two combatants u and v, both 
of whom have offensive capabilities modelled by target sets. The playing space is divided into four 
regions; a u-win region, a v-win region, a region of joint capture and one of draw. Two differential 
games with state constraints are defined: the u-game in which player u tries to drive player v into 
u's target set with player v's target set as a state constraint and the v-game which is the reverse. 
In the u-game, player u minimizes a cost functional and v maximizes it, while in the v-game the 
reverse is true. The subdivision of the playing space into regions and the determination of optimal 
strategies within the regions is based upon the solution of these two games. In [4], value and 
saddle point strategies (in the sense of Friedman [5]) are shown to exist for the above state 
constrained ifferential games, under suitable conditions. An interior penalty function approach 
is proposed for the computation of approximate optimal feedback strategies; this is shown to 
possess uitable approximation and convergence properties. In this paper, the two-on-one combat 
game (TOCG) is analyzed in a similar fashion by setting up several state constrained ifferential 
games. 
In the context of pursuit-evasion, Hagedorn and Breakwell [6] have investigated the problem 
of two pursuers and one evader. Breakwell and Hagedorn [7] investigate the capture of two evaders 
in succession. These papers treat specific problems where the vehicles are modelled as having simple 
motion, that is they move at constant speed and have infinite turn capability. The analysis has also 
been motivated towards finding capture regions by means of barriers [8]. In this paper, the general 
problem of setting up a decision framework for two-on-one combat games is addressed. This will 
hopefully be a step towards the eventual solution of "practical" problems of this genre. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an informal discussion of TOCG 
emphasizing the questions that arise; in Section 3, a mathematical framework in terms of 
state-constrained differential games is proposed; and Section 4 considers olution methods. 
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2. A DESCRIPT ION OF TWO-ON-ONE COMBAT GAMES 
A typical two-on-one combat situation is pictured in Fig. 1. There are three vehicles u, v, and 
v2, represented as mass-points, moving in a plane at constant speed and bounded turn rates ("car" 
model [8]). Each vehicle has a fan-shaped target set centered along its velocity vector. The vehicle 
u is superior to the other two in terms of its maneuverability and/or its weaponry (its target set 
is larger). One vehicle is said to capture another when the latter enters the former's target set. 
Vehicle u, or player u aims to capture both of the other vehicles (or players). Players v~ and v2, 
on the other hand, maneuver to prevent his and try to capture u instead. 
The above picture reveals several facts about two-on-one combat games. First: suppose u can 
capture v~ and v2 each in the absence of the other, this information does not imply anything for 
the two-on-one combat game in general. This can be shown to be so by simple counter-examples. 
Second: once u has captured either opponent, it is intuitively clear that the subsequent encounter 
is a combat game between the surviving players. The mathematical formulation of the game must 
take this into account, both in the equations of motion and in the definition of capture. Suppose 
that v~ is the player that is captured by u first; also the u vs v2 game solution is available--the r gion 
in state space where u can capture v2 and the value V (some function of the state vector x) of the 
game are known. Then, the original two-on-one combat game can be reduced to an equivalent 
combat game. This equivalent combat game terminates when u captures v,: u plays so as to 
minimize a cost functional that is the sum of an integral cost upto capture and V; the state 
constraint is the union of the v~ and v2 target sets. The players vl and v2 can be combined into a 
team or super player v. The player v plays to maximize u's cost functional subject to a state 
constraint which is that Vl and v2 must avoid capturing each other. Third: there are several different 
possible outcomes of the two-on-one combat game; these have to be carefully classified according 
to some stated player preferences and a decision framework has to be evolved. Suppose, for 
example, the team v can capture u only with the loss of one of its members, but can avoid capture 
by u indefinitely (a draw), then the team can opt for either of these alternatives depending on its 
preferences. If it is assumed that destruction of u is of paramount importance, then the team will 
opt for the first alternative, otherwise the second may be chosen. 
In the following a mathematical framework for two-on-one combat games is formulated and the 
above intuitive ideas are made precise in a general framework. 
3. MATHEMATICAL  FORMULATION 
The equations of motion of the three players u, vl and v2 arc, respectively, 
dxl 
dt = f' (t, x I, u), 
dx2 
dt = f:(t, x2, vl), 
u x,  
(Xl, Yl) 
×2 Vl 
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_x__23d = f3 (t, x3, v2), (3) 
dt 
where xm, x2, x3 are nm, n2 and n3 dimensional vectors respectively. The state vector of the game is 
the n-dimensional vector ~ which has x~, x2, and Xa as its components, that is i,=(Xl, x2, x3). The 
game starts at the instant to with ~(to)= ~.  The controls of the three players u, v~ and v2 are 
measurable functions taking values in U c ~p, V~ c ~, ,  I"2 ~- ~tq2, where U, Vj and I"2 are compact 
subsets. 
Each player has a target set in which it can capture any of the other two players. Player u's target 
set ~ is given by 
u (4) 
where ~,, = G~,2 x ~,3, and ~'u2 = GI.3 x ~ n2. Similarly, the target set of player v~ is given by 
(5) 
where ~.  = G2j X ~n3, and ~v, 2 = G2. 3 X ~"t ;  the target set of player v2 is 
22,=22, U 222, (6) 
where 22~ = G3j x ~,2, and 222 = G3.2 x ~",. 
In these expressions, the G~.j __. ~ x ~',  ÷"j, for i = 1 . . . .  ,3, j = 1 . . . . .  3 are closed subsets. It is 
assumed that there exists a time T* such that Vt/> T*, [t, ~] ~ ~,, fq 22 N (2,, U 22, ). 
The player i is said to have been captured by the player j at the instant ~,j, to ~< t;.j < T*, such 
that 
t,.j = inf{/> to l[t, ~(t)] e int ~ }. 
(Here int denotes the interior of the set, and inf denotes infimum.) The values of i,j range from 
1 to 3, representing player u, vt and v2 quantities respectively. For instance, i = 2,j  = 1 in the above, 
means the capture of player v~ by player u, so that ~ = 2,,. Whenever player u is captured, the 
game terminates immediately. The game continues beyond the instant, say tm, at which one of the 
players v~ or v2 is captured till another capture occurs or T*, whichever is earlier. Over the time 
interval [t~, t ], the player captured at t~, say v~, is said to be disabled; its capture set becomes null. 
Also, once vj is captured, the sets GI. 2 and G3, 2 become equal to ~ x ~ hI+n2 and ~ x ~ n2÷n3 
respectively. If v2 is the first to be captured, the corresponding subsets G U and G2, 3 expand to cover 
the respective spaces. 
The TOCG terminates at the instant t at which one of the following events occurs: 
(I) Player u is captured by the team v as follows: 
(a) at t either v~ or v 2, or both jointly, capture u and no other capture occurs over [to, "t ]; 
(b) at some instant t, t~ [to, "t], player u captures either va or v2, and is captured by the 
survivor at ~; 
(c) at t, player u and one team member, either v~ or v~, jointly capture ach other while the 
other team member avoids capture over [to, t ]. In this event, the TOCG ends in a win 
for the team v. 
(2) Both players v~ and v2 are captured by player u as follows: 
(a) at some instant/',/" ~ [to, t ], player u captures either v~ or v~ and captures the survivor 
at ~. This event is a win of the TOCG for player u. 
(3) The player u and the team v jointly capture each other as follows: 
(a) at some instant/',/" ~ [to, t ], player u captures either v~ or v2; the surviving team member 
and u jointly capture ach other at i; here the TOCG ends in the joint capture of u by 
v and of v by u. 
(4) The TOCG continues up to the time T* as follows: 
(a) no player is captured up to T*; 
(b) at some instant ', t" e [to, t ], player u captures either v~ or v:; no other capture occurs up 
to T*. 
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In describing all the possible terminations of the TOCG above, it is assumed that v, and v2 play 
sensibly in that they do not run into each other's target sets. 
From any given initial phase point [to, ~],  one of the mutually exclusive vents (1)-(4) must 
occur. First a system of player preferences for the above events that also distinguishes between the 
sub-events i set up. The preferences of player u are 
2a>4b>-4a>-3a  >- lb, lc>- la, (7) 
where the symbol >- here denotes is preferred to. The preferences of team v are 
la>- lb, lc >4a>4b> 3a> 2a. (8) 
In each ordering, the sub-events (lb) and (lc) are of equal preference, so that the player will 
distinguish between them only based upon a payoff. 
Depending upon which of the four events occurs for each phase point, the phase space ~¢ x ~" 
can first be divided into the four regions q~ (u win), q~, (v win), ~u v~, (draw), and q~u ^. (joint 
capture). These regions can be further subdivided into subregions where the sub-events correspond- 
ing to each event will occur. Since the game outcome depends entirely on the problem data, the 
initial point and the stated player preferences, all consistent strategies will be such that the game 
trajectory remains within the region to which the initial phasepoint belongs. 
Next a set of differential games is defined; the solutions of these games are associated with the 
partition of the phase space into regions and subregions and will also yield a basis for determining 
player strategies. A u~ game is defined as follows: a cost functional 
I tu I 
J. = g.[£().~), ~,] + h.[t.x(t) ,u(t),v~(t).v2(t)]dt (9) 
, / to  
is given with player u as the minimizer and players v~. v2 as the joint maximizers. The terminal time 
t., is specified by 
~. = inf{t >i h,, I[t, ~(t)l ~ int ~'.~ }, (10) 
where h.~. the time of capture of player v2 by player u is given by 
t3,~ = inf{t0 ~< t < T*t[t. x(t)l e int ~u2}" (11) 
This is subject to the following event constraints for player u: 
[ t ,~(t ) ]¢ int~, .U~2 ' Vto~< t ~< t3,,, 
[t, i(t)] ¢ int ~,~, Vt3. I < t ~< ~r, (12) 
and the constraint 
[t, ~(t)] ¢~ int ~,~U~2 2 Vto ~< t ~< t3.1, (13) 
for player v. A u2 game is defined with u minimizing a cost functional 
f 
iu 
Ju: = g.[x(t~2), t.2] + h.[t, f~(t), u(t), vl (t), v2(t)] dt, (14) 
dto 
and the players v~, v2 jointly maximizing it. [The functions gu and hu in expressions (9) and (14) 
are the same.] The terminal time t., is specified by 
tu: = inf{t I> t2.~ I[t, ~(t)] e int ~.,}, (15) 
where t2,~, the time of capture of player vl by player u is given by 
t2,t = inf{t0 ~< t < T* t [t, ~(t)] e int ~.~ }; (16) 
this is subject to the following event constraints for player u: 
[ t ,~(t ) ]¢ int~, ,U~2 ' Vt0<~ t ~< t2,1, 
[t, i(t)] ¢ int ~,~ Vt:.~ < t ~ ~,, (17) 
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and the event constraint 
for player v. 
[t, ~(t)] ~ int ~,2U~22 Vt 0 ~< t ~< t2. , (18) 
Next, three games are defined with the team v as the minimizer and player u as the maximizer. 
The first is the v game with a cost functional 
f / '  
J~, = g~,[x (t~,), tv] + h~,(t, ~(t), u(t), v, (t), v2(t)] dt. (19) 
o
The terminal time t,, is specified by 
t~, -- inf{ t > to I[t, i (t)] E int ~.l~ U ~,2~ }, (20) 
subject o the following event constraint for player v: 
[t,~(t)]~int ~U~,2U~22 Vto<<.t <~'t~,. (21) 
The second is the v~ game with a cost functional 
f:0 J,, -- g.[i (~,,~), }.,] + i(t),u(t),v,(t),v2(t)]dt. (22) 
The terminal time t~,, is specified by 
t., = inf{t >i h,, l[ t, i (t)] s int ~,,, }, (23) 
with t3: once again given by equation (11). The event constraints that player v is subject o are 
[t, i(t)] ~ int ~u, Vt0 ~< t ~< t~, (24) 
and 
[/,~(t)]~int2,2U222 Vt0~< t ~< t3.,. (25) 
Player u is subject to the event constraint 
[t, ~(/)] ~ int 2. U22, Vt0 ~< t ~< t3. l . (26) 
The third is the v2 game with a cost functional 
ft ~L'2 
J,'~ = g,'[x (t~'~), t~'2] + h,,[t, f~(t), u(t), vl (t), v2(t)] dt. (27) 
0 
The terminal time t,,2 is specified by 
t,'2 = inf{/i> 12, t lit, ~(/)] ~ int 22z }, (28) 
with t2: given by equation (16). The event constraints that player v is subject o are 
It, i(t)] ¢ int ~2 Vt0 ~< t ~< t,,2 (29) 
and 
[t, i(t)] ~ int 2,2U2~2 Vt0 ~< t ~< t2,,. (30) 
Player u is subject to the event constraint 
[t, i ( t ) ]¢int  2,,U~.2, Vt0~< t ~< t2. ,. (31) 
In all the v games, the functions g, and h,, are the same. 
Remark 3.1 
Certain restrictions have to be imposed on the cost functionals in the above defined games for 
them to be physically meaningful. The function h~ in (9) and (14) should not depend on the disabled 
player's control or state vectors after the instant of capture; for example, in the u~ game, h~ should 
not depend on v2(t) or x3(t) beyond the time instant t3:. Since the same function h, appears also 
in the u2 game and there it should not depend on v~ (t) or x2(t) beyond the instant tz~, it follows 
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that hu should be independent of team v controls and state vectors after the capture of either vl 
or v2. The function h~, in (19), (22) and (27) should be similarly restricted. It will be seen later in 
the paper (see Remark 3.2), that these restrictions on hu and hv are not as severely limiting as they 
may appear at first glance. [] 
Now suppose that the initial phasepoint [ o, i0] ~ #~. The v, v~ and v2 games are infeasible because 
team v cannot prevent player u from capturing both vt and v2 and thus causing violation of the 
event constraints for v, given by equations (21), (24) and (29). The region ~ can be further 
subdivided into the three subregions ~,  ~ and ~3, where the Ul game is alone feasible, the u2 
game is alone feasible and both games are feasible, respectively. In ~,  player u will elect to play 
the Ul game, if J~ < J~2 (both calculated with v playing its corresponding maximizing strategy), and 
the u2 game if Jul > J~:. In the case of equality, an interesting possibility of nonuniqueness of
strategies can arise. Thus, in ~u, strategies are computed by solving zero-sum differential games 
with event constraints. 
If [to, i0] ~ ~,, both u~ and u2 games are infeasible. Team v's preferences, as given in (8), indicate 
that the team will choose to play the v game whenever it has feasible strategies for it, regardless 
of what payoff it can secure in the v~ or v2 games. Denote by ~, the subset of ~v where the v game 
is feasible. In q~,, the v game, as given by equations (19)-(21) will be played. A further subdivision 
of ~,, can be done by dividing ff~,, - ff~ into three subregions ~,  ~ and ~ where the v~ game alone, 
the v2 game alone and both games are feasible. In q~, team v will select he game which will yield 
a lower payoff rom among the v~, v2 games. In either case, player u chooses its strategy to maximize 
Jv~ or J,'2 as the case may be. Thus in ~,, too, strategies are determined by solving zero-sum 
differential games with event constraints. 
Next suppose that the initial phasepoint [ o, i0] is in the draw region #~,,. While both player 
u and team v prefer to draw if they cannot win, the former prefers outcome (4b) to outcome (4a), 
equation (7), and the latter the reverse, equation (8). Let ~ ,  be the subset of ~ ,  over which 
team v can enforce (4a). In this subregion, the v game is alone feasible and terminates at T*. Thus, 
the strategies for u and v in this region are obtained by solving the v game with u maximizing Jo 
and v minimizing it subject to the event constraint (21); a fixed time zero-sum game situation. 
The remainder of the ~, ,  region, that is ~u~,.- • ~,  can be further subdivided into three 
subregions, 2 3 4 2 ~,~,,, ¢~w, and ~,~,,. In ~u~,,, player u can capture v 2 before time T* but not v~ so 
that the ut and v~ games are feasible. Similarly, ~3 is the region of feasibility of the u2 and v2 
games with termination at T*. The subregion ff~,, = ~,~,, - U~= iff~u~,,. In all of these subregions, 
termination is at the fixed time T*. 
In the region ~2,v~,, player u will play to minimize J,~ subject o the event constraint (12) and 
~uvv, team v will play to minimize J~., subject o the event contraints (24) and (25). Similarly in 3 
player u will play to minimize J~2, subject to the event constraint (17) and team v will play to 
maximize J,'2 subject to (29) and (30). These are a set of non-zero sum games. 
In the region ¢,~ ~ ~,, a somewhat arbitrary decision scheme is proposed based upon two facts: first, 
the Ul game and the v2 game cannot be played together, neither can the u2 and the v~ games; second, 
player u can capture either v~ or v2 within T* but not both. In this scheme, player u selects the 
game pair u~, v~ or u2, v2 that yields a lower payoff or it. Team v abides by u's choice and minimizes 
its corresponding payoff J,,~ (for the u~, v~ pair) or J,,: (for the u2, v2 pair). Thus once again strategies 
are computed by solving non-zero sum differential games. 
. . . .  # .... and Finally suppose that [to, io] e • ..... The v game is not feasible. As before, 1 2 3 ~UAV 
denote the subregions of ff~^~, where the game pair ut, vt is feasible, u2, v2 is feasible and both pairs 
are feasible respectively. The terminal times t~t = },,, and }~2 = t~2" In ¢~^v, the game pair which has 
the lower time will be played and capture will occur at the earliest ime that each player can force. 
Each player will minimize its own cost functional. The resultant game is a non-zero sum game with 
event constraints. 
Based upon the above analysis strategy selection rules for TOCG are given in Table 1. The 
TOCG models combat problems with a team of two players opposing one. 
Remark 3.2 
The scope of the restrictions imposed on the functions hu and ho (Remark 3.1) can now be 
discussed. The division of the region ~u into the subregions ~,  ~ and ¢,~ depends only on the 
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Table 1. Strategy selection rules in TOCG 
Subregion Player u strategy Team v strategy 
¢~ min J~, 
¢~ min J~2 
4,3 min J~, or J~? 
¢~ max J,. 
¢~ max J,., 
• ~ max J,.: 
¢~ max J,, or J,,:~ 
¢~,  max Z. 
~r  min J.i 
• ~,  min Ju2 
~P~,. min J~, or J~§ 
~^,, min J~, 
• ~^, min J~, or J~§ 
max J~l 
max J~2 








min J~t or J,'2§ 
rain J,.~ 
min J,'2 
min J~L or J,'2§ 
fWhichever yields a lower minimum for player u. 
SWhichever yields a lower minimum for team v. 
§Whichever yields a lower minimum for player u with team v 
minimizing the corresponding J~. 
feasibility of the games ul and u2, and not on the cost functionals J.~ or J,2" Thus in ¢',, u can 
capture vl and v2 only if it first captures v2; in ~ the reverse is true and in ~3 u can capture them 
in any order. The requirement hat the function hu in (9) and (14) be the same is needed only for 
[to, i0] e ~3 to decide which of the two feasible games ul and u2 is to be played. In this case, the 
restriction in Remark 3.1 is necessary. Suppose, however, that [to, ~]  e ~1. Then h. in (9) need only 
be independent of v2(t) and X3(t) over (t3A,Tut ]. Similar remarks hold for the restrictions on the 
function h~,. [] 
Solution methods for TOCG are discussed next. These are based essentially on the relationship 
between TOCG and combat games. 
4. SOLUTION METHODS 
Once one of the players vl or v2 is captured by u, the subsequent situation is clearly modelled 
by a combat game between the survivor and u, played in the space ~ x ~t+,3 (v2 survives) or 
x ~", +"2 (v~ survives). Suppose the TOCG starts with [to, i0] E cp~, so that the combat game is 
between u and vl. Since u can win the ul game, it follows that u can win the combat game with 
t + the survivor vl once v2 is captured, that is [ 3.1, xl, x2] ~ ~b~,, where q~, c ~x~",+"~ is the u win 
region of the combat game between u and vl (called the u/vl game). Under the conditions 
(A1)-(Ag), (BI)-(B3) of [4] the u/vt game has value, an X~-saddle point [5] and approximate 
feedback strategies. Suppose that the value of this game is a continuous function V~,(t, xl, x2), for 
all It, xl, x2] ~ q~,~. This function can be simply extended to the space :~ x ~" by taking 
ff~[t,f]=~V~(t, xl,x:), if [t, xt, x2] ~ ~b~,; 
[M, elsewhere, 
where M is a very large positive number. Next a u; game is defined with u minimizing a cost 
functional 
t t3"l Jul = ~u, [/3.1, x(13.1)] q" hu[t, x(t) ,  u( t ) ,  v I ( t ) ,  v2(t)]  dr ,  (32)  
0 
and with team v as the maximizer. The game terminates at the instant t3.1 which is still defined by 
equation (11). This is subject to the event constraints 
[t, ~(t)] ¢ int ~,.  U~,,~. Vt0 ~< t ~< t3,1, (33) 
for player u and (13) for team v. 
The u~ game is a combat game with an additional event constraint (13) for player v. 
Strategies are defined for player u for all three games ul, u~ and u/vl as in [5] and are denoted 
by A~,, A~i and A~/,,, respectively. Team v is considered as a single super player with a control 
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v(t) = (v~(t), v2(t)). Strategies are defined for team v for all three games ul, u~ and u/vl as in [5] 
and are denoted by F,,, F,~ and F,/,, respectively. 
The playing space of the u/v~ game can be extended from ~ x ~n~+n~ to ~ X ~n simply by 
adjoining the vector x3 to the state, with an arbitrary control function v~(t), say, chosen for the 
differential equation (3). This is possible because neither h, nor the terminal instant 7,, depend on 
either x3 or v2(t). Hence, strategies F,/v, can be extended to strategies F',/v, by defining the outcome 
v(t) of the latter to equal (vl(t), v2(t)). 
It is assumed that h, is positive and separable into terms that involve u(t) and v(t). Then, under 
conditions (AI)-(A9) of [4], suitably modified, Theorem 2.1 of [4] states that the u/v~ game has 
both value and an X, saddle point. Similarly, replacing condition (A4) of [4] by the requirement 
(A4') P,,[t, i] is continuous on [t, xL, x2] ~ 4),,, the following theorem is obtained: 
Theorem 4. I 
If the conditions (A1)-(A3), (A4'), (AS)-(A9), all hold for the u~ game given by equations 
(1)-(3), (32) and (33), and [to, x0] t int  ~P~, then the u~ game has both value and an X~ saddle 
point. 
Proof. This theorem is essentially the same as Theorem 2.1 of [4], with the additional 
complication of the event constraint (13) for v. The assumed structure of the TOCG equations 
(1)-(3) ensures that u can in no way affect (13). Since team v is the maximizer in this game, the 
constraint (13) is taken into account by imposing a large negative penalty in cost for any strategy 
Fg that leads to violation of (13)--see [5, Chapter 6]. Aside from this, the proof follows that of 
Theorem 2.1. [] 
Next, supposing the u/v~ and the u'~ games have values and X, saddle points and condition (A4') 
holds, then the following theorem holds: 
Theorem 4.2 
If the u/v~ game has value and an X, saddle point (A4') and Theorem 4.1 holds, then the uj game 
has value and an X, saddle point. The value of the u~ game equals that of the u~ game for the same 
initial phase point [to, ~]  e int ¢,~. [] 
Similar theorems can be stated for the u2, v, v~ and v: games. Next, an interior penalty function 
approach that yields arbitrarily close feedback approximations to the X, saddle point strategies of 
the players is described. 
4. I. Interior penalty function approach 
The interior penalty function approach for solving combat games described in [4] can be easily 
extended to solving all the u and v games set up in Section 3. The penalty function is set up in 
exactly the same manner and is subject o the same conditions (B1)-(B3). For solving the u~ game, 
the following sequence of unconstrained games 
Yk,, = L~ + rkJp -- s, Jq, (34) 
is considered. Here {rk} and {st} are decreasing sequences of positive numbers, Jp is an interior 
penalty term for the event constraint (33) and Jq, an interior penalty term for (13). As in [4], the 
functionals Jp and Jq approach infinity as the game trajectory approaches the boundary of the 
corresponding event constraint. The following two theorems are simply paraphrases of Theorems 
3.2 and 3.4 of [4] for the u~ game. 
Theorem 4.3 
Assume that conditions (AI)-(A3), (A4'), (A5)-(Ag), (B1)-(B3) of [4] hold and let 
[to, ~]  E int O~, then the (unconstrained) ifferential game with cost functional (34), motion given 
by (1)-(3), termination defined by (11), has value, an X, saddle point and optimal feedback 
strategies (almost everywhere), for any fixed constants rk and st. [] 
Definition 4.4 
For given rk and st, the above unconstrained differential game is called the (u~, k, l) penalty 
game. [] 
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Theorem 4.5 
Assume that conditions (A1)-(A3), (A4'), (A5)-(A9), (B1)-(B3) of [4] hold and let 
[to, ~]  e int ¢~; then for each ¢ > 0, there exists a positive number K such that V/, k/> K, the value 
of the (u'l, k, l) penalty game satisfies the inequality 
• A*  * (A.*, r.*,,) < (ak*.,, r**,) + E. (35) 
where the asterisk indicates saddle point strategies. [] 
This justifies using the penalty function approach to compute optimal approximating strategies 
for the u~ game for player u and team v. Similarly, Theorem 3.4 of [4] justifies penalty function 
computation of optimal approximating strategies for the U/Vl game. These two results can be put 
together to give a penalty functional 
~.k., = J~, + qjJo + rkJp -- s, Jq (36) 
for the u~ game. Here {qj } is a decreasing sequence of positive numbers and J0 is a penalty functional 
for the event constraint 
[t,:~(t)]¢int~.,, Vt3., <t  ~<7~ 
for player u. Based upon Theorems 4.3-4.5, the following theorems extend the penalty function 
approach to the u~ game: 
Theorem 4.6 
Assume that conditions (AI)-(A9), (B1)-(B3) of [4] hold and let [t0, i0]~int OI, then the 
(unconstrained) ifferential game with cost functional (36), motion given by (1)-(3), termination 
defined by (10), has value, an X, saddle point and optimal feedback strategies (almost everywhere), 
for any fixed constants qj, rk and st. [] 
Definition 4. 7 
For given qj, rk and sl, the above unconstrained differential game is called the (u,, j, k, 1) penalty 
game. [] 
Theorem 4.8 
Assume that conditions (A1)-(A9), (B1)-(B3) of [4] hold and let [to, i0] E int O~; then for each 
e > 0, there exists a positive number K such that Vj, k, ! I> K, the value of the (u~, j, k, 1) penalty 
game satisfies the inequality 
L,(a.*,  r . * . )<Y . . / (a** . , .  * * * , F j . , j )<~J , , (A, , ,F , , )+E.  [] (37) 
The optimal feedback strategies for the (u~, .~ k, l) penalty game can be computed via the Isaacs 
equation [9] by any other computational technique. Theorem 4.8 shows that the value of the penalty 
game can be made to approach arbitrarily close to the uE game. 
Similar results can be derived for the u2, v, v~ and v2 games. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A decision framework for TOCG has been developed in this paper. This is based upon the 
solution of five event-constrained differential games. An interior penalty function approach for 
solving these games is described. 
The differential equations that describe the TOCG in Section 4 are sufficiently general to 
represent most tactical applications. In particular the example described in Section 3 fits the above 
description. An extended version of the Turret game [2] with three players is being analyzed. 
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